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ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses on the anticipatory enhancement of methods of detecting stealth software. Cyber 
security detection tools are insufficiently powerful to reveal the most recent cyber-attacks which use 
malware. In this paper, we will present first an idea of the highest stealth malware, as this is the most 
complicated scenario for detection because it combines both existing anti-forensic techniques together with 
their potential improvements. Second, we present new detection methods, which are resilient to this hidden 
prototype. To help solve this detection challenge, we have analyzed Windows memory content using a new 
method of Shannon Entropy calculation; methods of digital photogrammetry; the Zipf–Mandelbrot law, as 
well as by disassembling the memory content and analyzing the output. Finally, we present an idea and 
architecture of the software tool, which uses CUDA-enabled GPU hardware to speed-up memory forensics. 
All three ideas are currently a work in progress. 
Keywords: rootkit detection, anti-forensics, memory analysis, scattered fragments, anticipatory 
enhancement, CUDA. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
According to the major antivirus companies, there 
is presently a significant rise in cyber-attacks, using 
hidden or rootkit malware (McAfee Labs, 2015a; 
Wangen, 2015; Symantec, 2015). Three tendencies 
in malware evolution have become apparent 
presenting corresponding cyber-security challenges. 
The first one is the custom-made malware attacks. 
Applying zero-day or unknown malware makes 
investigation of cyber security incidents 
significantly more difficult (Jochheim, 2012). 
Second, malware uses various anti-forensic 
techniques, evasion approaches, and rootkit 
mechanisms, which substantially impair their 
detection. Finally, investigating this malware has to 
meet very tight deadlines.  
Well-targeted malware attacks. Recent cyber 
security breaches appear to suggest that a wide 
range of cyber-attacks are well-targeted. Nowadays 
cyber intrusions are rising at an unprecedented 
pace. The modern malware such as BlackEnergy 
malware infiltrated the systems that control critical 
infrastructure, including oil and gas pipelines, water 
distribution systems and the power grid. The 
economic impact of such attacks will be colossal, 
for example, a cyber-attack on the 50 power plants 
in the USA could cause $1T in economic damage 
(Jeff, 2015). US Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
experienced an 18% increase in computer security 
incidents in the Nuclear Power Plants. These 
incidents include unauthorized access; malicious 
code; and other access attempts (Dingbaum, 2016). 
These cyber–attacks are already happening. Israel’s 
Minister of Infrastructure, Energy and Water said 
that the country’s Public Utility Authority had been 
targeted by malware. He believes that the terrorist 
organizations such as Daesh, Hezbollah, Hamas 
and Al Qaeda have realized this attack (Ragan, 
2016). In addition, U.K. government believes that 
ISIS is planning major cyber-attacks against 
airlines, hospitals and nuclear power plants 
(Gilbert, 2015). The recent hackers attack on 
Kaspersky Lab, which was the first cyber-attack on 
Antivirus Company and car cyber hijacking look 
paltry and unimportant. The Stuxnet-like malware’s 
tendency was reinforced by a cyber-attack on the 
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Kaspersky Lab (Kaspersky Lab, 2015). In this case, 
the malware focused on stealing technologies and 
snooping on ongoing investigations. The CEO said 
the following: “the cost of developing and 
maintaining such a malicious framework is 
colossal. The thinking behind it is a generation 
ahead of anything we’d seen earlier – it uses a 
number of tricks that make it really difficult to 
detect and neutralize. It looks like the people 
behind Duqu 2.0 were fully confident that it would 
be impossible to have their clandestine activity 
exposed” (Kaspersky, 2015). This vulnerability of a 
respected antivirus company reflects a highly 
sophisticated level of cyber-attacks. It presents a 
considerable challenge for zero-day detection for 
both Windows and Unix-based operating systems 
(Farrukh, & Muddassar, 2012).  
Anti-forensic techniques. Malware applies a 
variety of anti-forensic and rootkit techniques to 
overcome detection or makes it much more 
difficult. Currently the abnormal rise of anti-
forensic techniques and digital investigators cannot 
match this challenge (SANS Institute, 2015a). 
According to Alissa Torres, founder of Sibertor 
Forensics and former member of the Mandiant 
Computer Incident Response Team (MCIRT), 
“Attackers know how forensics investigators work 
and they are becoming increasingly more 
sophisticated at using methods that leave few traces 
behind – we are in an arms race where the key 
difference is training.” (Seals, 2015). This trend has 
been confirmed by the recent attack on Windows 
operating system (OS) using malware, which by 
encrypting itself was able to evade popular 
debugging tools (The Register, 2015). The authors 
also underline that “the attack is more likely to 
bypass security checks” and “the source of the 
attack is not easily identified by forensics analysis.” 
(Nat, & Mehtre, 2014). According to the McAfee 
Labs 2016 Threats Predictions “cyber espionage 
attacks have become stealthier and that they have 
become more impactful than prior breaches” 
(McAfee Labs, 2015b). As a result, it is not enough 
to create a new detection tool. We need to take into 
account both anti-forensic techniques: current ones 
and their expected future developments.  
Long-term malware infection. Malicious activity 
of stealth malware can result in financial, 
reputational, process, and other losses. There are 
several examples of malware, which have been 
stealing data for years. Spy network Red October 
(Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis 
Team, 2013) collected data from diplomatic, 
government and science agencies from the whole 
world for 5 years. Another example was the 
stealthy, sophisticated Regin malware, which has 
been infecting computers since 2008; the recent 
detection of dozens of its modules shows that this 
spy network is still active (Weil, 2014; Paganini, 
2015). Such a long-term malware infection is 
completely unacceptable for all business.  
Modern antiviruses do not cover these three aspects 
of new malware and have no ability to react swiftly 
against such highly sophisticated malware. Thus 
actual cyber security threats demand a complex 
review of all existing hidden malware detection 
methods. 
Aim of this project. There is a need to develop 
new methods of detecting hidden malware, which 
will be resilient to existing anti-forensic techniques 
such as rootkit countermeasures.  
In this paper, we present a research project which 
seeks to detect zero-day malware in the memory 
dump under deliberate countermeasures. By 
applying the synthesis of new methods, we can 
detect unknown malware in the memory at a very 
early stage and so prevent their negative sequelae.  
Motivation. This paper was inspired by the book 
‘The Art of Memory Forensics’ (Ligh, Case, Levy, 
& Walters, 2014) and the preliminary version of the 
book ‘Rootkits and Bootkits: Reversing Modern 
Malware and Next Generation Threats’ (Matrosov, 
Rodionov, & Bratus, 2016) and other papers. We 
were also inspired by helpful comments on the 
rootkit detection system MASHKA (Korkin, & 
Nesterov, 2014) from Luka Milkovic, Nicolas Ruff, 
Giovanni Vigna, Stefan Vömel and Ibrahim (Abe) 
Baggili.  
This paper consists of 6 sections. 
Section 2 is devoted to the comparative analysis of 
the methods used to detect stealth software. It 
describes how these methods work and what their 
vulnerabilities are. The combination of existing 
anti-forensic techniques shows that hidden malware 
can overcome all popular stealth software detection 
methods.  
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Section 3 contains the several scenarios of further 
improvements of anti-forensic methods. The idea of 
the most hidden driver or highest stealth malware 
(HighSteM), which overcomes all popular detection 
methods and their possible development. HighSteM 
functionality will be given; HighSteM can acquire 
sensitive information using memory access without 
any interaction with OS functions. The example of 
the keyboard keylogger, which works in this way, 
is discussed. As a result, we can simulate the most 
difficult case scenario for detection, and this will be 
used in further research of its detection. 
In section 4 HighSteM detection methods are 
presented. We will present a variety of ideas to 
solve the detection challenge, using methods of 
digital photogrammetry, the Zipf Mandelbrot law, 
and methods of artificial immune systems as well 
as by disassembling the memory content and 
analyzing the output. These methods will be 
analyzed in terms of their vulnerability to possible 
anti forensic techniques. Developing, testing and 
applying these new methods require a huge amount 
of computational resources, which are not 
accessible to the vast majority of laboratories. To 
solve this time consuming task we proposed using 
modern graphics cards or CUDA-enabled GPU 
hardware. 
Section 5 explores the idea of signature search 
optimization. As a basis for signature search the 
algorithm from the rootkit detection system 
MASHKA was chosen. The suggestion is to 
combine the facilities of CPU and GPU so that the 
part with calculating and linear search will use the 
number of cores of GPU. This helps to significantly 
accelerate linear search in the memory dump. 
Section 6 contains the main conclusions and further 
research directions.  
2. ANALYSIS OF THE DRIVER DETECTION 
APPROACHES IN THE MEMORY DUMP  
This project focuses on the detection of hidden 
drivers, as they have many opportunities to conceal 
themselves and because of operating in a high 
privilege mode they can affect the OS and antivirus 
software. Hidden drivers features are commonly 
used in spyware (Paganini, 2015; Musavi, & 
Kharrazi, 2014) and so the priority task for cyber-
security is the detection of hidden drivers in the 
Windows and Unix-based OS. Further analysis will 
be carried out for the most popular Windows OS, 
but all results can be adopted for Unix-based OS as 
well. 
This analysis of the more popular methods for 
detecting hidden software and their resilience to 
anti forensic techniques should be of great interest 
to cyber-security experts. This analysis of detection 
methods and corresponding countermeasures will 
be based only on publicly available information 
sources: books, papers in scientific journals, 
conference presentations, blog posts as well as 
discussions in forums. 
The explanation will be provided through the 
increasing number of drivers’ manipulations for 
self-concealment. Each detection method will 
include the corresponding rootkit techniques to 
hinder the malware or prevent its work. In addition, 
every following analyzed method will be resilient 
towards countermeasures of the previously 
analyzed method. 
2.1. Classification of Methods Used to Reveal 
Drivers  
The creation of resilient detection methods requires 
answers to the following questions: 
 How drivers work in Windows OS and 
how they can be hidden; 
 How to detect hidden drivers; 
 How to predict and face anti-forensic 
techniques.  
To formulate the prerequisites of driver detection 
the following topics will be covered in the next 
section: 
 The virtual memory content after a driver 
has been loaded; 
 The details and vulnerabilities of a 
Windows built-in tool, which collects data 
about installed drivers; 
 Analysis of the resilience of alternative 
approaches to detect drivers. 
In addition, the classification of the different 
methods used to detect drivers will be given. 
According to Blunden, (2012), before a kernel 
mode driver has been started, its executable file is 
loaded in the memory, the driver’s information is 
added in to several OS’ linked lists and it is after 
that, the DriverEntry function is executed. 
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Consider the situation with three loaded drivers A, 
B, and C. Figure 1 shows the content of the virtual 
memory prior to the loading of these drivers. To 
simplify the model, on the top of the figure, there 
are only two OS’ linked lists with three drivers’ 
structures, which correspond to the three loaded 
drivers. At the bottom there are three executable 
driver files. All these objects may be used as 
fingerprints to detect drivers.  
According to Russinovich, Solomon, & Ionescu, 
(2012) the Windows built-in tool uses one of these 
lists to receive information about loaded drivers. 
Assuming that list #1 is the list utilized by the built-
in tool, e.g. called NtQuerySystemInformation with 
SystemModuleInformation (11) information class. 
However as this is a list-based mechanism it is 
vulnerable to anti-forensic techniques. According to 
Blunden, (2012), by unlinking a driver’s structure 
from this list it is possible to conceal the driver 
from the built-in tool. This unlinking attack is also 
known as Direct Kernel Object Manipulation 
(DKOM) and this technique yields two positive 
results. The first is that the built-in tool is not able 
to find this driver; and second is that Windows OS 
and the hidden driver will continue to work 
correctly. 
Thus the hidden driver is one of the main cyber 
security threats, and to eliminate it a reliable 
method of detection is required to detect all hidden 
drivers. After all the stealth drivers are detected the 
incident response can be carried out, using special 
pre-filing investigations such as reverse-
engineering (Matrosov, Rodionov, & Bratus, 2016), 
although a review of this topic is beyond the scope 
of this paper.  
The most common technique to discover a hidden 
driver or any rootkit is to apply the cross-view 
approach, which checks equality between two 
drivers’ lists. The first list was created by the built-
in tool and the second list uses one of the 
alternative drivers’ detection approaches.  
Alternative detection approaches can be classified 
into two categories according to the subject of the 
search: first by using OS driver structures and 
second by using the content of the driver’s files in 
the memory. Their classification is given in 
Figure 2. The first approach can be further sub-
divided into two groups: based on the links between 
structures and a signature based search of drivers 
structures.  
The second approach can also be further partitioned 
into two subsets: signatures and a statistical based 
approach to detect the driver’s files in the memory. 
Each of these methods will be analyzed. The new 
detection approach l proposed at the end of this 
paper, is based on the statistical-based approach. 
 
 
Figure 1 Fingerprints of kernel-mode drivers in a memory dump: loaded drivers and their metadata  
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2.2. Approaches Based on the Links between 
Structures  
These methods receive the list of drivers by 
walking through the various linked lists of driver 
structures in the memory. 
We will be focusing on the most popular OS’s 
linked lists, which are used to detect drivers 
(Vomel, & Lenz, 2013): 
 List of drivers modules also called 
PsLoadedModuleList;  
 List of kernel mode threads from 
‘System’ process;  
 Drivers objects list from the object 
directory also called ObjectDirectory;  
 List of recently unloaded drivers;  
 Service record lists in the memory also 
called ServiceDatabase;  
 Database of installed services in the 
system registry.  
We will shortly discuss each of these lists and 
techniques used to hide data from each of them. 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Classification of methods to detect drivers  
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PsLoadedModuleList. The first and the most 
famous list PsLoadedModuleList, which is used 
by ZwQuerySystemInformation function or, in 
other words, by the Windows built-in tool. This is 
double linked to the list of 
KLDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY structures, 
which contain the data about each kernel module. 
The Volatility’s modules plugin uses this list. It is 
possible to hide a driver structure from this list by 
using DKOM unlinking. The details of this anti-
forensic technique are given in Hoglund, & 
Butler, (2005) and also in Tsaur, & Wu, (2014a) 
and realized in the DhpHideModule function of 
Dementia, the proof of the concept memory anti-
forensic toolkit by Milkovic (2012). 
Kernel-mode threads. According to the book 
(Ligh, Case, Levy, & Walters, 2014a) the process 
‘System’ with PID 4 includes the list of kernel 
mode threads. This list contains the ETHREAD 
structures. This idea is also used in the 
Volatility’s orphan plugin. However, an intruder 
is able to prevent detection using this list by 
rewriting sensitive information from the 
corresponding ETHREAD structure, e.g. field 
StartAddress. As a result, the modified structure 
will be of no use for detection. This anti-forensic 
technique will be referred to as DKOM patching. 
DKOM patching is a widely used technique. Here 
is an idea of how to hide EPROCESS structure – 
“instead of removing the process from the linked 
list, replace its content and technically the 
process should be "hidden", means it will still 
show up on taskmanager etc but when you try to 
close or dump it, it will close/dump the dummy 
process instead”. (Ch40zz, 2015)  
ObjectDirectory. The third list is the Windows 
Object Directory list or the object tree, which 
contains structures of different objects. In this 
paper, we are focusing on DRIVER_OBJECT 
structures. The details of how this tree is 
organized is given in Zhanglinfu2000 (2013) and 
Probert (2004). The documented function 
NtQueryDirectoryObject uses this tree to get the 
information about the specified directory object 
(MSDN, n.d.-a). However, the driver is able to 
conceal the corresponding DRIVER_OBJECT 
structures by DKOM unlinking. The details of 
this anti forensic technique are given in (Tsaur, & 
Yeh, 2015; Jakobsson, & Ramzan, 2008; Tsaur, 
& Wu, 2014a). The attack of hiding a driver from 
an object directory is implemented by the 
StealthInitializeLateMore function in the 
AntiMida by Pistelli (n.d) and in the Zion open 
source rootkit by Chen (2008). 
Recently unloaded drivers. This list includes the 
names, times, the start and finish addresses of 
recently unloaded drivers (Ligh, Case, Levy, & 
Walters, 2014b). This list is mentioned in the 
following papers (MJ0011, 2009; SANS Institute, 
2015b) as well as in the forum discussion 
(KernelMode.info, 2012). The Volatility’s 
unloadedmodules plugin uses this list. According 
to the Windows Research Kernel (WRK) the 
variable PUNLOADED_DRIVERS 
MmUnloadedDrivers stores the address of the top 
of this list, and by using 
MmLocateUnloadedDriver function it can locate 
the specified virtual address in the list (Microsoft, 
n.d.-a; Microsoft, n.d.-b). We can also get this 
address by calling ReadDebuggerData function 
with parameter 
DEBUG_DATA_MmUnloadedDriversAddr 
(MSDN, n.d.-b). However, an attacker can apply 
DKOM patching and overwrite sensitive fields in 
the corresponding structure, and therefore it 
makes the list unusable for detection. 
ServiceDatabase in the memory. According to 
(Ligh et al, 2014c) after the installation of a 
driver using Service Control Manager (SCM) 
corresponding information is added to the two 
lists. The first is the double linked list of service 
record structures in services.exe also known as 
ServiceDatabase. The second list is located in the 
system registry. Thus it is possible to get 
information about loaded drivers from 
ServiceDatabase using the EnumServicesStatus 
function with parameter 
SERVICE_KERNEL_DRIVER (MSDN, n.d.-c). 
The detailed analysis of SCM mechanisms is 
explained is several recent books (Stuttard, Pinto, 
Ligh, Adair, Hartstein, & Richard, 2014; Ligh, 
Case, Levy, & Walters, 2014d) as well as in the 
blog of D.Clark (Clark, 2014). The 
ServiceDatabase details and the many ways to 
conceal the service record structure and this is in 
the context of Blazgel Trojan in the book (Ligh, 
Adair, Hartstein, & Richard, 2010), which hides 
services by DKOM unlinking. Further examples 
of how to unlink a structure of hidden service are 
The 11th ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law 
 7   
 
given in Wineblat, (2009); Mask, (2011); 
Louboutin, (2010). 
Database of Installed Services in the system 
registry. As mentioned before if a driver is 
loaded using SCM, this information will also be 
duplicated in the system registry. The list of 
registered kernel mode drivers and user mode 
services is located in the following registry path 
“HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\Current
ControlSet\services”(MSDN, n.d.-d; Microsoft, 
n.d.-c). The detailed description of this list is here 
(OSR Online, 1997). We can get Information 
from this list, it can also be obtained by using 
registry API function RegEnumKeyEx. However 
this list is also susceptible to intruder 
countermeasures such as deleting the 
corresponding registry key, which contains the 
information about a hidden driver. An example of 
removing the driver-related information in the 
registry is given in Tsaur, & Wu, (2014b; ZCM 
Services, 2010). 
Table 1 summarizes the various analyzed 
approaches to detect drivers and their 
vulnerabilities. The first column gives the list and 
the respective structure names. The second 
column contains the software tools, which apply 
these lists. The last column shows the anti-
forensic techniques, which can defeat or 
overcome the detection. 
As a result, we can conclude that all approaches 
based on the links between structures are 
susceptible to anti-forensic techniques such as 
DKOM unlinking, DKOM patching and 
removing registry keys. Next, the paper will 
review the driver detection methods, which are 
resilient to these countermeasures, although they 
may have other weaknesses. 
2.3. Signature-based Search of Drivers 
Structures  
When a driver structure is concealed by using 
DKOM patching and all informative fields are 
rewritten then this structure is useless for 
detection. However, if a structure is hidden only 
by DKOM unlinking it can be revealed by a 
signature based search.  
Signature-based search of driver structures is 
based on the fact, that driver structures have 
typical fragments or in other words signatures, 
which are the same for all structures from one 
list. We can reveal all drivers structures by using 
byte-to-byte signature search regardless of 
whether or not a structure is unlinked. Signature 
based search can retrieve data and does not rely 
on API calls that can be subverted. Signature 
based search in some cases can be sped up 
significantly using the fact, that driver structures, 
e.g. DRIVER_OBJECT, are located closely to 
each other in the memory (Korkin, & 
Nesterov, 2014). 
 
 
Table 1 Summary table of the detection approaches based on the links between structures and their 
vulnerabilities  
List and structure names  Examples of lists using  Examples of Attacks  
PsLoadedModuleList, 
KLDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY 
 ZwQuerySystemInformation  
 Volatility’s modules plugin  
DKOM unlinking  ObjectDirectory, DRIVER_OBJECT ZwQueryDirectoryObject  
Service Record List, 
SERVICE_RECORD 
EnumServicesStatus  
List of kernel mode system threads, 
ETHREAD 
Volatility’s orphan plugin  
DKOM patching  
MmUnloadedDrivers, 
UNLOADED_DRIVERS 
 ReadDebuggerData 
 Volatility’s unloadedmodules plugin  
Service Record List in registry RegEnumKeyEx  Removing registry keys  
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Two signature types can be distinguished:  
 Signatures based on short byte sequence 
also known as pool-tag scanning; 
 Signatures based on stand-alone bytes 
also known as magic numbers in the 
structures.  
Pool-tag scanning. This signature is based on the 
fact, that each structure from one list contains the 
same four byte tags. This is one of the most 
popular ways to find structures in the memory. 
This tag could be added to the structure using two 
ways: with the function ExAllocatePoolWithTag 
or manual by a programmer. In the first case a 
four-byte tag value is added automatically at the 
beginning of the allocated pool memory. These 
values are reserved for each system structures. 
The pool tag list of Windows drivers is given in 
Rhee, (2009). In the second case such byte 
signature is added by the programmer. For 
example, while a driver is started, SCM creates 
the SERVICE_RECORD structure and adds the 
pool-tag value: (*ServiceRecord)->Signature = 
SERVICE_SIGNATURE, where 
SERVICE_SIGNATURE is 0x76724573 or 
"sErv" in ASCII. The details of this manipulation 
are in the source code (Microsoft, n.d. d). 
M. Ligh used the pool-tag scanning detect 
Windows threads (Ligh, 2011). 
Magic numbers in the structures. The second 
type of signature is based on the fact that 
structures from one list have some common 
peculiarities. This signature includes only the 
bytes, whose values are the same for all linked 
structures on the list. Also apart from the single 
bytes, we can also use the fact that kernel mode 
structures include the fields, whose values are 
linked with other kernel mode structures. 
Therefore these values exceed the values of 
0x8000_0000 (Schuster, 2006). This peculiarity 
was described by (Tsaur, & Chen, 2010; Haukli, 
2014) and after that was enhanced in Dynamic 
Bit Signature (DBS) to detect hidden structures 
(Korkin, & Nesterov, 2014). 
The summary table of signature-based search 
methods of driver structures is in Table 2.  
As a result, simultaneously applying both anti 
forensic techniques: DKOM unlinking and 
DKOM patching renders drivers’ structures 
useless for detection and significantly hinder 
further analysis. Next, we will cover driver 
detection approaches, which do not rely on driver 
structures; therefore, these approaches are able to 
detect the hidden driver, which uses both the 
above mentioned countermeasures. 
 
Table 2 Summary table of signature-based search methods of driver structures  
List and structure names  
Signature 
examples  
Signature using example  
PsLoadedModuleList, 
KLDR_DATA_TABLE_ENTRY  
Tag signature 
“MmLd”  
Cohen (2014)  
Service Record List, 
SERVICE_RECORD  
Tag signature 
“sErv” or 
“serH”  
Hidden Service Detector (hsd) by EiNSTeiN_ 
Ligh, Case, Levy, & Walters (2014f)  
 
Volatility’s SvcScan plugin by  
Ligh, Case, Levy, & Walters (2014g) and 
Vomel, & Lenz (2013)  
ObjectTable, DRIVER_OBJECT  
Tag signature 
“Driv”  
Volatility’s modscan plugin by  
Ligh, Case, Levy, & Walters (2014h)  
Byte signature  Tsaur, & Chen (2010) and Haukli (2014)  
Dynamic bit 
signature  
Korkin, & Nesterov (2014)  
 
The 11th ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law 
 9   
 
2.4. Signature-based Detection of Drivers Files  
Signature-based search of drivers’ files uses 
priority known fragments of drivers’ files as 
signatures; therefore, these methods are not 
susceptible to manipulation with drivers’ structures. 
In comparison with the previous signature-based 
methods, these methods use a similar byte-to-byte 
search for drivers’ files, but not for drivers’ 
structures. 
There are three types of signatures to find driver 
files to be discussed:  
 ASCII strings;  
 Magic numbers in the PE-header;  
 OpCode patterns.  
ASCII strings The first type of signatures includes 
various strings from an executable file. The best 
known example of ASCII strings signatures is 
“This program cannot be run in DOS mode” from 
MS-DOS header (Timzen, 2015; x86 
Disassembly/Windows Executable Files, n.d.). M. 
Russinovich used this string while analyzing 
Stuxnet (Russinovich, 2011). Also, import table, in 
other words, symbolic names of functions 
belonging to ASCII strings signatures. The example 
of this signature is used to analyze packed PE files, 
“The Presence of certain functions in the import” 
(NTInfo, 2014).  
How to bypass ASCII strings signatures? The 
ASCII strings signatures are not resilient to the 
following countermeasures. First the hidden driver 
can overwrite its MS-DOS header in the memory; 
and this manipulation does not influence its OS 
work (Qark, n.d.). Moreover, to hinder detection a 
hidden driver can use only two imported functions 
LoadLibrary and GetProcAddress. It is also able to 
perform the function-resolution tasks and to call on 
any other functions (Eagle, 2011). As a result, the 
import table will include just only two names, 
which will not be enough for detection.  
Magic numbers in the PE-header. The second 
type of signature is based on the peculiarities of the 
PE-header content (ELF-header in UNIX case) or 
in the magic numbers. This signature is a byte 
template, which includes the field values of PE 
header and their corresponding offsets from the 
beginning of the file (Dorfman, 2014; Choi, Kim, 
Oh, & Ryou, 2009). An example of the application 
of magic numbers in the PE-header to detect 
unknown malware is presented by Wang, Wu, & 
Hsieh (2009). An example of adopting this 
signature to ELF-header for unknown malware 
detection in the OS Linux is given in Farrukh, & 
Muddassar (2012). 
How to bypass magic numbers in the PE-
header? The hidden driver can bypass this type of 
signature using a similar overwriting technique. 
After the driver has been loaded its PE-header 
integrity is not needed. Therefore a rootkit can 
overwrite the content of PE-header and bypass 
signatures based on magic numbers. This approach 
was also proposed by Tsaur, & Wu (2014c). 
Opcode patterns. The third type of signatures is 
based on the common factors in the content of the 
compiled file. Each driver is an executable file, 
which includes sets of machine language 
instruction or operation codes, and further opcodes, 
which are executed by CPU. An Instruction Set 
Architecture (ISA) includes a specification of the 
set of opcodes. Different drivers have similar 
opcode fragments, because they are executed on the 
same CPU architecture. The most popular example 
of using opcodes as a signature is the search of 
starting and ending of functions. The corresponding 
opcodes are also known as functions prolog and 
epilog and they depend on calling convention 
(Calvet, 2012). There are three popular calling 
conventions that are used with C/C++ language: 
stdcall, cdecl and thiscall (Chen, 2004). Opcode 
based signatures are used to detect various malware 
(Santos, Brezo, Nieves, Penya, Sanz, Laorden, & 
Bringas, 2010; Santos, Sanz, Laorden, Brezo, & 
Bringas, 2011; Zolotukhin, & Hamalainen, 2014). 
There are numerous examples of using opcodes for 
detection (Ghezelbigloo, & VafaeiJahan, 2014; 
Singla, Gandotra, Bansal, & Sofat, 2015; Yu, Zhou, 
Liu, Yang, & Luo, 2011).  
An example of using opcode byte combination to 
find hidden service structures is given in (Ligh, M. 
2015a; Ligh, M. 2015b). Opcode patterns are also 
used in firmware analysis. The pattern matching 
tool Binwalk detects the potentially executable data 
by identifying known function prolog and epilog 
patterns (Binwalk, 2015).  
Opcode-based signatures could be further 
developed using control flow analysis (Ding, Dai, 
Yan, & Zhang, 2014) and data mining techniques 
(Siddiqui, Wang, & Lee 2008; Santos, Brezo, 
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Ugarte-Pedrero, & Bringas, 2013) and also varied 
classification techniques (Shabtai, Moskovitch, 
Feher, Dolev, & Elovici, 2012). 
How to bypass opcode patterns? Several authors 
have pointed out that applying prolog and epilog 
signatures as well as using other ISA opcode 
patterns does not make it resilient to anti-forensic 
techniques. A rootkit can bypass opcode patterns by 
obfuscating prolog and epilog functions. An 
example of hiding functions call is given in Emil’s 
Projects, (2010). Also malware can evade the 
signature based detection by packing the original 
code using custom packers (Arora, Singh, Pareek, 
& Edara, 2013).  
As a result, we can conclude, that despite the fact 
that the signature-based search of drivers files is 
resilient to manipulation with driver structures, this 
search is susceptible to other anti-forensic 
techniques. An intruder can circumvent signature 
based search of drivers files in memory by 
overwriting sensitive data for ASCII-based 
signatures and signatures based on PE-header 
features; as well as encrypting, packaging and 
obfuscating of content of a driver file (Saleh, 
Ratazzi, & Xu, 2014; Dang, Gazet, Bachaalany, & 
Josse, 2014; Aronov, 2015).  
Further, we will present an analysis of driver 
detection approach, which is resilient to 
combination of all previous anti-forensic 
techniques. 
2.5. Statistical Detection of Driver Files  
Statistical detection of driver files is able to reveal 
loaded drivers in the memory files, without using 
any fixed signature. This detection approach is 
based on the fact that the content of driver files is 
significantly different from the content of other 
memory parts.  
Statistical detection of driver files includes two 
phases. In the first step, we evaluate the memory 
content by calculating various statistics for each 
memory offset. This technique is also known as the 
sliding windows approach. In the second step, we 
find memory regions with abnormal values for the 
calculated statistics. These memory regions are 
very likely to have a driver code or raw machine 
code.  
An impulse of using the statistical memory analysis 
to find an executable code in the memory is given 
in Lyda & Hamrock, (2007), which specified the 
Shannon's entropy notion and was the first to apply 
binary entropy. The authors discovered that by 
comparing entropy values it is possible to separate 
different data types: plain text, native executables, 
packed executables and encrypted executables 
(Brown, 2009).  
According to the blog post (Suszter, 2014) “entropy 
analysis is very useful to locate compressed, 
encrypted, and other way encoded data; higher 
entropy can indicate encoding of some kind; lower 
entropy is likely to include anything else such as 
text, code, header and data structures.”  
Our analysis of publicly available sources shows 
that there are no facts of using entropy to detect 
hidden drivers in the memory. However, entropy is 
applied in various spheres of cyber security 
(Matveeva, 2014), such as finding an executable 
code in the office document files (Jochheim, 2012; 
Pareek, Eswari, Babu, & Bangalore, 2013; 
Iwamoto, & Wasaki, 2014; Tabish, Shafiq, & 
Farooq, 2009), in PDF-files (Schmidt, Wahlisch, & 
Groning, 2011; Pareek, Eswari, & Babu, 2013), in 
the network traffic (Nguyen, Tran, Ma, & Sharma, 
2014), in the analysis of unknown binary files 
(Yurichev, 2015). Entropy analysis is also used to 
find cryptographic keys in the memory dump 
(Maartmann-Moe, 2008). This successful 
experience can be applied to find hidden driver 
content in the memory and detect rootkits.  
Entropy analysis of individual files is the most 
commonly used method to solve the task of files 
classification, for example, to separate packed and 
encrypted file from an unprotected file. According 
to (Devi, & Nandi, 2012) ‘it is very important to 
figure out whether a given executable is packed or 
non-packed before determining whether it is 
malicious or benign’. If certain conditions are true, 
such as, the file has a high entropy value, unknown 
MD5 hash value and also it has no digital signature, 
it is most likely that this executable file is malware 
(SANS Institute, 2014; Nataraja, Jacob, & 
Manjunatha, 2010). In addition, in this author’s 
opinion antiviruses can usually detect weird 
applications using entropy. To develop a ‘well done 
rootkit’ we need to be creative about entropy (Lupi, 
2011).  
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The sliding window approach allows us to calculate 
a variety of statistics. Together with the formula of 
binary entropy by (Lyda, & Hamrock, 2007) there 
are other ways of calculating entropy (Hall, & 
Davis, 2006). Also apart from entropy in the sliding 
window approach, we can use other statistics such 
as arithmetic mean, Chi square and Hamming 
weight (Conti, et al., 2010). Jochheim, (2012) 
thinks that the most useful statistics in file 
classification are the following: average, kurtosis, 
distribution of averages, standard deviation and 
distribution of standard deviations. One of the 
prospective methods to measure binaries is to apply 
Kolmogorov complexity for detecting malware 
(Alshahwan, Barr, Clark, & Danezis, 2015).  
In the case of memory dump, we do not have 
separate files and so we can apply the sliding 
window approach or its various modifications. One 
such example is given by (Matveeva, & Epishkina, 
2015). The authors proposed constructing a byte 
value / byte offset dependency graph. Byte offsets 
are placed on the horizontal axis, and byte values 
are on the vertical axis. After that, the authors 
calculate and construct a frequency byte 
distribution for various window-form fragments of 
the first plot. The authors suggest using the 
following fragment sizes 100x100 and 2000x50.  
Another approach is to use the following 
configuration of sliding window method: each 
block has fixed length 256 bytes, “Each block has 
an overlap of 4 bytes.” “A short-term Fourier 
analysis is applied to every 4 bytes of the entropy 
stream.” (Jochheim, Schmidt, & Wahlisch, 2011)  
For further analysis of the memory dump these 
authors suggest the following methods: Short-term 
Fourier Transform (STFT) (Schmidt, Wahlisch, & 
Groning, 2011; Iwamoto, & Wasaki, 2014) or 
Wavelet transform (Matveeva, & Epishkina, 2015).  
Other ways of calculating statistics apart from 
binary entropy by are suggested by (Lyda, & 
Hamrock, 2007), who using one byte, we can also 
calculate entropy using two bytes or using bigram 
analysis (Nataraja, Jacobb, & Manjunatha, 2010), 
as well as using three bytes or trigrams (Conti, et 
al., 2010). Along with the analysis of individual 
values statistics, we can also evaluate the memory 
content using n-gram analysis (Pareek, Eswari, & 
Babu, 2013; Nath, & Mehtre, 2014).  
It is possible to carry out memory analysis using 
both manual and automatic modes. The idea of 
automated classification of different file types, such 
as random, text, machine code, bitmap, compressed 
images, encoded and encrypted data exposed in the 
paper (Conti, et al., 2010). To solve a classification 
problem the authors first calculated threshold 
values for different data types by using test 
samples. Their results solved the classification 
problem with the appropriate values of false 
positives and false negatives. An alternative 
example of solving the classification problem by 
using entropy is given in (Bat Erdene, Kim, Li, & 
Lee, 2013).  
Artificial intelligence methods look very promising 
for solving the classification problem, but the 
authors thought that these methods are 
insufficiently precise, because of errors of the first 
and second types (Jochheim, 2012).  
To make manual analysis of memory easier and 
faster we can use various visualization techniques. 
In his paper Jocheim suggested using the following 
byte blot: each byte in the file was colored 
according to this bytes hex value, e.g. zero bytes 
and bytes with value 0xFF are black and white 
correspondingly. Using this approach, we can 
easily locate zero pages in the memory as well as 
the particular sections of an executable file – .text, 
.data, .rsrc.  
An alternative approach for visualizing data uses 
space-filling curves proposed by A. Cortesi. He 
analyzed various approaches of how to visualize 
the file content, such as Zigzag, Z-order and Hilbert 
to find encrypted blocks (Cortesi, 2012). As a result 
of this work the author developed tools to visualize 
content using both web-site (Cortesi, 2015a) and 
local host PC (Cortesi, 2015b).  
Visualization of files or memory dumps is an up 
and-coming direction in cyber-security, which was, 
confirmed by various projects: thus the cantor.dust 
project was presented at the REcon'13 conference, 
Binwalk, binglide, Vix/Biteye, senseye and many 
others (Visualizing ELF binaries, 2014).  
In addition, it is possible to apply a combination of 
the approaches mentioned before. An example of 
using signature-based and statistical approach was 
presented by (Merkel, Hoppe, Kraetzer, & 
Dittmann, 2010). 
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How to bypass statistical detection? At the same 
time, the statistical detection approach is also 
vulnerable to anti-forensic techniques. The idea of 
countermeasures is to apply the manipulations, 
which decrease the entropy of driver content and as 
a result seriously hinder localizing a driver code in 
the memory areas.  
There are only two publicly available 
countermeasures to decrease entropy: the first is to 
use Multiple Files and the second is to add memory 
blocks with zero entropy.  
The first method is used in the Stuxnet and Flame, 
which deliberately decreased the entropy values 
using Multiple Files to achieve ‘lesser 
maliciousness entropy’ (Teller, 2013; Schuberth, 
2014).  
The second one is also known as a meta 
obfuscation technique by null content insertion. 
Executable code can also hide itself by reducing 
entropy values of its memory content with the help 
of including memory fragments with low entropy. 
An example of such manipulation is used in 
spyware program Zeus and it includes inserting 
blocks of symbols with zero entropy. Moreover, 
according to the blog post, many packers use this 
anti-forensic technique to hide the fact that this file 
has been encrypted – “some very good packers and 
protectors of malware try to reduce entropy by 
inserting zero bytes in data. The reason is that virus 
scanners react to files with high entropy” (NTInfo, 
2014).  
To bypass the circumvention, i.e., to detect such 
malware the authors (Pedrero, Santos, Sanz, 
Laorden, & Bringas, 2012) proposed a way to 
localize and delete such data blocks and after that 
calculate entropy values. The latter was made 
possible by applying byte histograms to analyze the 
contents of the file. However, applying byte 
histograms is also vulnerable to the corresponding 
anti forensic technique, as discussed below. 
2.6. Conclusion  
The above analysis shows that all popular 
approaches to detect drivers are susceptible to anti-
forensic techniques, see Table 3.  
By joining the results of this chapter and the work 
(Korkin, & Nesterov, 2014) we can state that the 
most popular framework for memory analysis, 
Volatility is also vulnerable to anti-forensic 
technique and moreover that malware can 
overcome Volatility in both stages: memory 
acquisition and memory dump analysis.  
To sum up we can conclude that a driver can be 
hidden in different ways (Jason, 2012) but the 
results will always be the same – running 
uncontrolled code in the privilege memory area and 
the content of this code will have a low entropy 
value.  
This work focuses on the anticipatory development 
of advanced cyber-security solutions. As a result, in 
this project we will create a new hidden driver 
detection method, which will be resilient to current 
driver countermeasures and their possible 
development.  
The task to detect a driver comes down to the 
recognition task between the executable driver code 
and data fragments, which are stored in the 
memory.  
 
Table 3 The list of popular approaches to detect drivers and their vulnerabilities  
The ways to detect drivers  Anti-forensic technique  
Using driver 
structures 
Using links between structures  DKOM unlinking 
Signature-based search  DKOM patching 
Using content of 
driver files 
Signature-based detection  DKOM patching & PE packing 
Statistical-based detection  Memory patching 
 
The 11th ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law 
 13   
 
3. THE IDEA OF THE HIGHEST STEALTH 
MALWARE (HIGHSTEM)  
In this section we will look at a prototype of the 
most hidden driver or Highest Stealth Malware 
(HighSteM). The goal of this section is to create a 
list of possible anti-forensic techniques, which 
include both evasion mechanisms for popular 
detection approaches, and the present authors’ 
ideas on how to avoid statistical-based detection 
(Pedrero, Santos, Sanz, Laorden, & Bringas, 
2012). We are trying to create anti-forensic 
measures, which can prevent detection even by 
future detection tools. As a result, we will 
formulate the most difficult scenario for 
detection. The next section will deal with 
detection of HighSteM.  
Malware can use different ways to start up: using 
shellcode in PDF-file or by registry facilities for 
loading instead of the file system (Santos, 2014; 
Marcos, 2014), but all in all the malware 
executable code will be loaded and reside in the 
memory.  
It is well known that the code, which is running 
in the lowest level, and is close to hardware, has 
the greatest potential for self-concealment There 
are various levels of code execution: inside OS 
user mode (ring 3), kernel mode (ring 0) and 
outside OS VMX root mode or hypervisor (ring -
1), SMM (ring -2) and AMT (ring -3). We chose 
kernel mode (ring 0), which is the most popular 
among malware and spyware platforms. 
HighSteM will be the kernel mode driver for 
Windows OS or a loadable kernel module (LKM) 
for UNIX-based systems.  
As a basis to develop the HighSteM prototype, 
we will select the FU rootkit (Blunden, 2012) or a 
stub driver, which is loaded using ATSIV utility 
by Linchpin Labs (Linchpin Labs, 2010). The 
results of our preliminary research revealed that 
ATSIV uses an undocumented startup method, 
which conceals a driver from the most popular 
anti-rootkit tools (Korkin, 2012). In addition, it is 
possible to use Turla Driver Loader, which loads 
a driver without involving Windows loader 
(hfiref0x, 2016) 
We can load any driver using both built-in 
Windows tool (eg Service Control Manager) and 
by third party software (like Atsiv or Turla Driver 
Loader). In the first case drivers information is 
added in all system lists, while in the second case 
just a few lists will be updated. 
The HighSteM prototype will apply a variety of 
anti forensic techniques. First of all HighSteM 
will include techniques to prevent the detection of 
existing approaches, the details are in Section 2 
Then we present some ideas on how to improve 
these anti-forensic techniques. HighSteM could 
improve Zeus’s manipulations to hide from 
entropy analysis by the following three steps: 
1. Insert blocks of symbols, with low 
nonzero entropy value;  
2. Use blocks with different size;  
3. Significantly increase size and number of 
inserted blocks.  
On the one hand applying these three steps makes 
a driver definitively hidden from Pedrero‘s 
methods (Pedrero, Santos, Sanz, Laorden, & 
Bringas, 2012) and, moreover, they can help to 
develop the most complex case for detection,. 
However, on the other hand, these steps will lead 
to certain negative effects: the size of the driver 
will increase and its speed of operation will 
decrease. The reasons for these disadvantages are 
blocks of inserted symbols, so there will be many 
time consuming jumps between pieces of the 
driver code.  
We also propose an idea based on HighSteM’s 
payload and how to realize this in a stealthy way. 
The main strategy is to elicit sensitive 
information by reading various memory regions, 
without using the functions, which can be hooked 
by anti-viruses. An idea of the keylogger, which 
collects keystrokes by checking the 
corresponding memory fragment, was first 
proposed by Ladakis et al (2013). These authors 
apply the GPU facilities to access physical 
memory. They also proposed to check a memory 
region by including keystrokes with 100ms delay. 
This time is enough to collect all keystrokes with 
an average typing speed and also with optimal 
system’s overhead, which is less than 0.1%. This 
paper focused only on the Linux OS.  
Adapting this idea for Windows OS is given by 
(Stewin, & Bystrov, 2012). These authors 
describe how to find the OS structure that 
contains the most recent keystrokes, but without 
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its internal details. To find out these details the 
authors propose using reverse-engineering 
analysis of the kbdhid.sys file, which may be 
challenging.  
Our preliminary research reveals, that keystrokes 
buffer is stored in the DEVICE_EXTENSION 
structure, the source code for a USB keyboard is 
here (Microsoft, n.d.-e) and also for a PC/2 
keyboard (Microsoft, n.d.-f). This structure 
includes the KEYBOARD_ATTRIBUTES 
structure, which contains the desired codes of 
keystrokes and other additional flags. The similar 
structure – KBDHID_DEVICE_EXTENSION is 
used in ReactOS, which is close to Windows OS 
(ReactOS, n.d.).  
This memory-based monitoring technique looks 
promising. On the one hand, it acquires sensitive 
information and on the other hand, cyber-security 
tools and well-known event tracing solutions are 
not able to control memory access. This is the 
most difficult situation for detection.  
In the next section, we suggest some ideas of how 
to detect HighSteM-based rootkits. 
4. DETECTION OF HIDDEN SOFTWARE 
UNDER COUNTERMEASURES  
To achieve this goal the following three tasks 
need to be tackled:  
A. Research and develop a prototype of the 
hidden driver, which can overcome 
existing detection methods.  
B. Check the driver prototype using existing 
detection methods and tools.  
C. Design new methods to detect hidden 
drivers using analysis of Windows OS 
memory.  
To solve task A we are going to use the example 
of the keyboard driver filter as the basis for the 
prototype of the hidden driver (Blunden, 2009). 
We are planning to take the following measures 
to hide this driver. We will load the driver 
prototype with the help of publicly available 
ATSIV utility by (Linchpin Labs, 2010). This 
driver will be concealed from the signature search 
by patching its PE-header in the memory. To 
develop HighSteM we will solve the optimization 
problem, with the following two variables – the 
size and number of inserted blocks of symbols 
and the following three constraints: 
 The maximum driver size – up to 10 
megabytes;  
 The level of decreasing speed of 
operation – no more than two times;  
 The level of entropy decreasing – no less 
than two times.  
To speed up the development and testing of this 
driver we will use the already prepared memory 
analysis system (Korkin, & Nesterov, 2014). 
To solve task B we will use the following popular 
tools to detect a deliberately hidden driver: 
Kaspersky TDSSKiller, GMER, RootRepeal, 
Avast Anti-Rootkit, Dr.Web CureIt!, Sophos 
Anti-Rootkit, F-Secure Blacklight and the most 
popular memory analysis platform – Volatility 
Framework (MidnightCowboy, 2015; Ligh, Case, 
Levy, & Walters, 2014). As a result, we will 
experimentally prove that these cyber security 
solutions are not able to detect this prototype of 
the hidden driver. 
On stage C, we are going to apply these three 
ideas to find the executable code in the memory 
dump: 
1. New methods of entropy calculation and data 
analysis:  
1.1. Use function P*(2-P^2) instead of 
P*log(P) to calculate entropy. Our 
preliminary analysis showed that this 
function grows faster on the interval 
from 0 to 1, than the original entropy 
and that is why it looks more appropriate 
for the analysis of computer memory;  
1.2. Analyze dependence of calculated 
entropy values from different lengths of 
sliding windows and its further spectral 
and wavelet analysis;  
1.3. Apply methods of digital 
photogrammetry to find the executable 
code in the graphical diagrams of the 
memory content;  
1.4. Use Zipf–Mandelbrot law to analyze the 
executable code and data in the memory 
content.  
2. Disassemble memory content and carry out 
the thorough analysis of the received 
assembler code, using the following ways:  
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2.1. Instruction Frequency Analysis;  
2.2. Evaluation of the logic of the assembler 
code;  
2.3. Design and analysis of the control flow 
graph based on the received set of the 
assembler code.  
To implement the first idea, we are planning to 
use numerical computing environment 
MATLAB. Applying MATLAB built-in 
functions helps us to focus on statistical ideas 
rather than on their implementation and testing.  
Methods of digital photogrammetry are 
commonly used to locate different objects on the 
digital images, for example, human faces on 
photographs. When it comes to hidden drivers 
detection we have to face a similar challenge – to 
localize memory fragments with anomalous 
entropy values, which correspond to the 
executable code (Cortesi, 2012; Kohli, 
Lempitsky, & Barinova, 2015).  
The Zipf–Mandelbrot law is used to check the 
self-organization, correctness and systematicity 
of literary works. The executable code has similar 
properties, which is why we will use this law to 
evaluate the code and data in the memory.  
To realize the second idea about applying 
disassembling, we will use the Capstone and 
BeaEngine, which are the open source libraries to 
disassembly both 32 and 64 bits code (Nguyen, 
2014).  
Analysis of frequency of assembler instructions 
includes preliminary and detection phases. In the 
preliminary phase, we will calculate the threshold 
frequency of instructions from memory 
fragments, which include only the executable 
code and only the data. In the detection phase, we 
will calculate frequency instructions from each 
memory fragment and compare their frequency 
with threshold values. Evaluation of logic will be 
made by checking that the result of the 
instructions execution does not overwrite the 
previously achieved results. The design and 
analysis of control flow graph will be performed 
using Interactive Disassembler IDA (Blunden, 
2012). A similar idea of disassembling the part of 
the code is utilized in Volatility’s driverirp plugin 
with ‘--verbose’ flag to reveal TDL3 infection. 
TDL3 uses the Stealth Hooks technique and 
Redirector Stubs to hide the fact of hooking 
functions (Ligh, Case, Levy, & Walters 2014i). 
We will consider the following two limitations of 
this research:  
1. Analysis of the memory content will be 
given only for 32-bit and 64-bit Windows 
7 OS, as the most popular OS, without 
analysis of Unix-based OS, such as Mac 
OS, Linux and mobile OSes.  
2. We will consider the executable samples, 
which do not apply obfuscation and 
polymorphism techniques.  
However, such analysis requires significant 
computing capabilities from the analyst’s 
workspace, for example, rootkit detection system 
MASHKA spends about half hour to check 
memory dump, which is far too long and hence 
not applicable in practice.  
To speed-up the analysis we proposed an idea 
based on the use of modern video or graphics 
cards. To do this we will present an idea of 
accelerating memory analysis using the CUDA 
library and NVIDIA graphics card. 
5. GPU ACCELERATED 
SIGNATURE-BASED MEMORY DUMP 
ANALYSIS  
Nowadays modern workstations, laptops, 
notebooks and even tablets are equipped with one 
or several GPU components. Besides gaming 
opportunities such components offer general high 
performance parallel computing possibilities for a 
long time. For memory dump analysis it is 
important that such devices can transfer CPU 
load to GPU, and also are very suitable for 
signature-based and statistical analysis. Obtaining 
memory dump on modern workstations is a 
separate CPU-intensive task. Thus permanent 
analysis is barely possible but periodic continual 
dumping is a realistic scenario. Such time-based 
periodic dumping and analysis can dramatically 
load CPU and may be inappropriate during 
simultaneous regular work.  
This paper offers a statistical confidence 
estimation of hidden malware and several 
algorithms to form a criterion of significance for 
memory dump segments. Most of the mentioned 
algorithms may be efficiently run in parallel due 
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to inner data parallelism. As a result, most of the 
analysis may be effectively transferred to GPU 
dramatically diminishing CPU-load during 
processing. This section also describes the 
principles of fine-grained algorithm splitting to 
run memory dump analysis effectively on hybrid 
CPU/GPU aware architectures.  
The reason we need to develop an appropriate 
GPU kernel based code for CUDA aware GPUs 
is the internal highly localized cohesion between 
memory dump data segments and applicable 
statistical algorithms. Such cohesion makes 
memory dump analysis very close to classical 
box filtering and convolution filters run on GPU. 
Both of them have good and effective 
implementations for CUDA aware GPUs and also 
show very high scalability and performance. 
Memory throughput is no longer possible because 
of a bottleneck due to extensive data transfer 
between host based and GPU-based memories. 
As a part of the newly announced “Boltzmann 
Initiative” AMD presents the Heterogeneous-
computer Interface for Portability (HIP) tool. 
New heterogeneous system architecture will 
allow us to automatically convert CUDA code by 
HIP and expand the possible hardware base 
available to run what was formerly an exclusively 
CUDA-based applications (Silcott, & Swinimer, 
2015). So nowadays CUDA may be the best 
choice to meet current and future requirements 
for consumer and enterprise-based hardware from 
both vendors.  
 This approach further involves differentiating 
memory dump analysis algorithms based on 
different memory-access profiles during 
processing. Two main profiles are easily 
discovered: local signature-based detection and 
memory lookups to resolve virtual to physical 
memory layouts (Korkin, & Nesterov, 2014).  
Local signature based detection is the most 
appropriate for running on GPU; memory model 
and kernel execution principles are best suited for 
running such analysis. CUDA box filtering and 
convolution based examples bundled with the 
CUDA toolkit are optimal starting points, and as 
such processing is effectively done to boost 
filtering and analysis performance.  
To utilize multiple available GPU there are two 
ways to handle them either as independent 
devices or alternatively as a single one through a 
unified memory model using modern CUDA 
improvements. Starting with CUDA 4 unified 
virtual addressing is supported, and this provides 
a single virtual memory address space for all the 
memory available in the system. Memory 
addressing and management enables pointers to 
be accessed from the GPU code no matter where 
in the system they reside, whether in device 
memory (on the same or a different GPU), host 
memory, or on-chip shared memory. Latter 
improvements to overcome PCI-Express’s low 
bandwidth and high latency are available since 
CUDA 6 platform. This brings out managed 
memory, which is accessible to both the CPU and 
GPU by using a single pointer. The key of the 
improvement is that the system automatically 
migrates data allocated in unified memory 
between the host and device so that it looks like 
CPU memory to code running on the CPU, and 
like GPU memory to code running on the GPU.  
Despite the above mentioned advances it is a 
complicated task to utilize such functionality 
when non-uniform GPUs are installed and so 
hand-coded algorithm splitting must be done to 
avoid non-local memory addressing. To counter 
this another approach was developed with high-
grained algorithm splitting based on memory-
access patterns during signature-based detection.  
5.1. Hybrid CPU/GPU Architecture 
Requirements  
Software architecture for signature-based 
detection must allow effective highly scalable and 
accelerated memory dumps analysis. Memory 
datasets may be accessed through interposes -
communication with dumping routines or inner 
communication through shared thread storage. 
Another source of bulk datasets may be from 
some SOCKET-based network layer where 
datasets from different nodes are aggregated and 
analyzed. As a part of the research such a 
SOCKED-based layer was developed to further 
allow research and investigation into building 
trusted networks with secure runtime memory 
dump analysis and incident systems. 
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Figure 3 Architecture of a network-aware software platform for memory dump analysis 
 
A signature-based threaded detection system 
must: 
 Effectively run on nodes with single or 
multiple GPUs, on multicore and 
multiprocessor systems;  
 Allow different GPU memory layouts 
and data handling strategies to allow 
benchmarking and work on different 
GPU architectures;  
 Meet CPU counterpart implementations;  
 Do benchmarking and algorithm 
variations for different global, texture, 
constant and shared memory available 
resources and data arrangement;  
 Minimize thread divergence, where 
threads of the same wrap branch to 
different section of code.  
 Confirm single instruction multiple 
thread manner and prevent GPU 
scheduler from allocating extra execution 
slices to possible branches;  
 Ensure coalesced memory aces by 
wrapping branches.  
 
The goal to promote a network-aware software 
platform to memory dump analysis naturally 
leads on to the development of scalable tool and 
architecture to be able to simultaneously perform 
statistical processing and provide analytics. The 
main architecture principle lies in modular and an 
extensible object-oriented pipelined framework to 
allow parallel code execution on shared memory 
multi-processor platforms. A reliable network 
aware software platform consists of a dedicated 
message broker and dedicated RDBMS cluster to 
register network connections and analysis 
requests, as shown in Figure 3. 
5.2. Overview of Network-aware Architecture  
A server-side component was also developed. It 
provides endpoints of communication using a 
socket network programming interface. Server-
side components are responsible for handling 
connections from the different nodes, which 
make requests to perform the forensics analysis 
of their memory dumps.  
In its turn an object-oriented pipelined framework 
is responsible for promoting event demultiplexing 
and concurrent processing of the heterogeneous 
CPU/GPU architecture. The application starts a 
stream that presents a set of hierarchically-related 
analysis and reporting services. Network data 
demultiplexing and further asynchronous 
processing Reactor (Reactor pattern, n.d.) was 
selected as the main programming pattern. This 
programming pattern makes a unified 
asynchronous event handling which is generated 
replies
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by a timer-driven callout queue, I/O events 
received on communication ports, events from 
GPU kernels and CPU-processing threads, as 
shown in Figure 4. 
Each processing step in the hierarchically-related 
analysis and reporting stream presents a threading 
pool that makes parallel processing possible. The 
thread pool is configurable and responsible for 
spawning, executing, synchronizing and 
gracefully terminating managed threads and data 
flow through the processing stream. Initial 
benchmarking is done to adjust the different task 
decomposition policies to permit parallel 
processing on GPU and CPU resources with 
different computing capabilities and 
performances. 
5.3. Overview of Pipelined Processing 
Workflow. Further Development  
Network-aware software platforms for memory 
dump analysis may be an essential component for 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). Such 
components may reside on dedicated high 
performance hardware or virtualized platforms. 
High performance tools that can utilize available 
multicore CPU and multiple GPU are required. 
Such tools process highly sensitive data and 
further research and development must be done to 
assure security and confidence. Digital signing 
and correct identification, authentication and 
authorization schemes must be provided and there 
is also a need for mechanisms for integration with 
the latest directory services. 
 
 
 
Figure 4 Architecture of Parallel Processing on GPU and CPU resources 
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6. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
1. Detection of zero-day malware is a 
well-known and current central challenge 
in cyber security. This analysis shows that 
existing detection approaches are 
susceptible to rootkits which apply a 
variety of different countermeasures.  
2. To create the most difficult case scenario 
for detection we propose a driver prototype 
based on existing anti forensic techniques 
and their possible upgrades. To find such a 
driver we propose various improvements 
on statistical-based detection.  
3. We proposed an idea of using the facilities 
of both GPU and CPU to speed up memory 
analysis.  
6.1. The Idea of a Dynamic Memory Map  
Another idea of rootkit detection is the Dynamic 
Memory Map tool. This tool will help to visualize 
memory content of virtual or physical addresses 
with multicolored rectangles, corresponding to 
different drivers and kernel services, as well as a 
user mode process. If we have found a memory 
fragment with an executable code, which is not 
registered in the OS, it will mean that our OS has 
been infected and this executable code has to be 
subject to an additional inspection. This tool will 
have two modes of operating: as an on-air map and 
a logger of all memory accesses to/from the chosen 
memory scope. Using Intel VT-x with Extended 
Page Tables (EPT) technology we will be able to 
achieve portability for all new Intel CPUs, reduce 
significant performance losses and make this tool 
resilient to common OS-based anti-forensic 
techniques. A collaboration with Satoshi Tanda 
(Tanda, 2015) has suggested a preliminary 
implementation of such a tool and early results look 
promising. This results will be presented at the 
REcon conference 2016 in the paper “Monitoring & 
controlling kernel-mode events by HyperPlatform”. 
6.2. Applying Virtual Reality (VR) Headset to 
Digital Forensics Applications 
Modern technologies present new devices for head-
mounted display (HMD) system: Virtual Reality 
(VR) headset or VR gear, which are extremely 
popular nowadays. These devices have the 
following advantages:  
 Comfortable for eyes, “it's like watching a 130-
inch television screen from 10 feet away”; 
 Cheap, “Google Cardboard headsets are built 
out of simple, low-cost components”; 
 VR useful in a wider variety of roles, not only 
for gaming. 
We propose an idea to use the opportunities of VR 
headset in an incident response during the analysis 
of various system logs and memory dumps. In 
addition, VR headset can be used to analyze the 
control-flow-graph of disassembled code during 
reverse-engineering process. New 3D view from 
VR headset, instead of existing 2D picture from 
desktop PC, could speed-up analysis and makes it 
more easily.  
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